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THE “LAW OF RAMSEY COUNTY” – REFLECTIONS OF A 
TRIAL JUDGE ON STATE GOVERNMENT GRIDLOCK 
Judge Kathleen Gearin† 
 
“A statesman gains little by the arbitrary exercise of ironclad 
authority upon all occasions that offer[.] A little concession, now 
and then, where it can do no harm is the wiser policy.”1 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Partisan gridlock at the Minnesota State Capitol inevitably heads 
south along a well-worn path from the Cass Gilbert-designed capitol 
building to the Ramsey County District Court’s classic art deco structure. 
During my tenure as Second Judicial District Chief Judge,2 I presided over 
 
 †  Judge Kathleen Gearin served as a Minnesota Second Judicial District Judge for 
twenty-six years, including four years as Chief Judge. She retired in 2013. The author 
expresses her appreciation to Mitchell Hamline School of Law students Lori Dockendorf-
Nudd, Katherine McKim, and Heather O’Neill for their research and editorial assistance.  
 1. SAMUEL L. CLEMENS, A CONNECTICUT YANKEE IN KING ARTHUR’S COURT 141 
(1917) (offering an account of Hank Morgan, a nineteenth-century New England resident, 
forced to navigate the medieval English legal system following a journey through time and 
space). 
 2. The Second Judicial District encompasses the City of St. Paul and its immediate 
suburbs. The district is most commonly referred to as Ramsey County District Court. All 
ten judicial districts in the state contain multiple counties except for the two with the largest 
populations: Ramsey County and Hennepin County, which includes the City of 
Minneapolis and its suburbs. 
1
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two of these gridlock cases: Brayton v. Pawlenty in 20103 and In re 
Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Executive Branch of the 
State of Minnesota in 2011.4 Despite the gravity of the constitutional issues 
at stake in these cases, only the first resulted in a substantive decision by 
the Minnesota Supreme Court.5 The procedural posture and actions of 
the coordinate branches that ultimately resolved the 2005 state 
government shutdown and the 2011 budget crisis resulted in supreme 
court rulings that left the ultimate constitutional issue of whether the 
judicial branch can order disbursements from the state treasury 
unresolved. 
The lack of prior appellate level review in these cases was put on full 
display in the most recent government gridlock conflict, Ninetieth 
Minnesota State Senate v. Dayton.6 In that case, when then-Chief Judge 
John Guthmann noted that no appellate court had ever passed judgment 
on the legality of court ordered temporary funding, one party grasping for 
an argument said, “[w]ell, it’s the law of Ramsey County.”7 Though it is 
unlikely that Chief Judge Guthmann found the argument particularly 
persuasive, it underscores the lack of clarity in this area of Minnesota 
constitutional law. However, unlike these earlier cases, Ninetieth 
Minnesota State Senate did reach the Minnesota Supreme Court in 2017, 
and its decision finally gave some guidance on how district courts should 
respond to future government gridlock and what powers the Minnesota 
Constitution confers on each branch. The decision, however, rests on 
specific facts relating to the amount of operating funds available to the 
legislature prior to the start of the next regularly scheduled session and 
judicial restraint principles. That case will be discussed later in this article. 
Part II of this article briefly describes the Minnesota state budgeting 
process.8 Part III provides an overview of earlier Minnesota state 
 
 3. Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. 2010).  
 4. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting Motion For 
Temporary Funding, In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Executive Branch 
of the State of Minnesota (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. June 29, 2011) (No. 62-CV-11-5203), 
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2011/other/110561/62CV115203_Executive_findings_of_
fact.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WUW-3YVM].  
 5. Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 357. 
 6. See Ninetieth Minn. State Senate v. Dayton, 903 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 2017). 
 7. Briana Bierschbach, How One County Court Came to Play Such a Big Role In 
Minnesota Politics, MINNPOST.COM (July 6, 2017), https://www.minnpost.com/politics-
policy/2017/07/how-one-county-court-came-play-such-big-role-minnesota-politics/ 
[https://perma.cc/B63J-PZQZ].  
 8. Infra Part II. 
2
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government shutdowns.9 Part IV summarizes the procedural history in the 
Brayton and In re Temporary Funding.10 Part V describes Ninetieth 
Minnesota State Senate and discusses the challenges of balancing public 
interests with the demands of the Minnesota Constitution.11 Part VI 
concludes with a warning that the “law of Ramsey County” is evolving, and 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Ninetieth Minnesota State 
Senate makes it less likely that future Ramsey County chief judges will 
authorize expenditures from the state treasury in the event of a shutdown. 
It also makes it likely that if funding is judicially ordered, it will be far 
narrower in scope.12 Finally, this article also suggests that Minnesota would 
be better served by adopting a default budget statute, such as those used in 
Wisconsin and Rhode Island, rather than continuing with the threat of 
shutdowns.13  
II.  STATE BUDGETING OVERVIEW 
The Minnesota Constitution requires that the legislature and 
governor adopt a balanced two-year budget (known as the biennial budget) 
for state government operations.14 While the state constitution does not 
expressly enumerate this balanced budget requirement—the issuance of 
debt is only allowed for express purposes;15 borrowing money to pay for a 
budget deficit is not one of those purposes.16  
Minnesota law contemplates a collaborative budgeting process 
between the executive and legislative branches. In January of every odd-
numbered year, the governor, with the assistance of the state budgeting 
agency, Minnesota Management and Budget, proposes a comprehensive 
and balanced two-year state budget to the legislature.17 This proposal is 
 
 9. Infra Part III. 
 10. Infra Part IV. 
 11. See infra Part V. 
 12. See infra Part VI. 
 13. See infra Part VI. 
 14. See MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 5 (1857); MINN. STAT. § 16A.04(1) (2017); MINN. 
STAT. § 16A.11(2) (2017). See generally MINN. ISSUES RESOURCE GUIDES: STATE BUDGET 
PROCESS, MINN. LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBRARY (2016), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/lrl/guides
/guides?issue=budget [https://perma.cc/Q3DP-3WWV]. 
 15. See supra note 14. See also LEGISLATIVE PARTY CONTROL: A CHART, 1901 TO 
THE 
PRESENT, MINN. LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBRARY (2018), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/lrl/histor
y/caucus_table [https://perma.cc/TQV3-9J2H]. 
 16. MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 5. 
 17. MINN. STAT. § 16A.11 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 16A.04 (2017). In addition to a 
detailed operating budget, Minnesota Statute section 16A.11 directs the governor to submit 
3
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further refined in late February or early March after new economic 
forecast data becomes available.18 The governor and the legislature must 
then reach an agreement on a balanced budget and enact the needed 
appropriation and revenue laws by the first Monday following the third 
Saturday in May—the date that the Minnesota Constitution requires the 
legislature to adjourn.19 When the executive and legislative branches do 
not reach an agreement, it creates a state government funding crisis, which 
then ends up in the courts all too often. Like almost all lawsuits, they are 
initiated at the district court level. In these cases, the venue is Ramsey 
County district court—located in Minnesota’s capital city, St. Paul. 
These statutory and constitutional requirements give the executive 
and legislative branches about three and a half months to reach an 
agreement on a state budget for the next two fiscal years. If no agreement 
is reached by the May deadline, the governor may call a special legislative 
session, which recalls legislators to the state capitol.20 Thus, the true 
deadline of consequence for the legislative and executive branches to 
reach a budget agreement is July 1 when the new fiscal year begins.21 If 
they fail to reach an agreement by that date, it is unclear what should 
happen. There are no statutes addressing what, if any, state treasury 
disbursements are allowed absent appropriations bills passed by the 
legislature and signed by the governor. 
Minnesota is not the only state with a balanced budget requirement. 
Forty-nine states require balanced budgets, with Vermont as the sole 
exception.22 What constitutes a balanced budget, and what mechanisms 
must be used to keep it balanced in the event revenues or expenses 
outstrip expectations, varies from state to state. Despite the differences, the 
balanced budget requirement is an enduring fixture of the state legislative 
process (unlike at the federal level). 
 
a “budget message” and a capital investment budget to the legislature. The capital 
investment budget (or “bonding bill”) is submitted in even-numbered years. Id. at subdiv. 
2, 4. 
 18. See MINN. STAT. § 16A.103 (2017). See also MINN. H.R., RESEARCH DEP’T, 
THE 
STATE BUDGET PROCESS (2016), https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/issinfo/gvst_sbp.as
px?src=14 [https://perma.cc/WNR7-DYSW].  
 19. See MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 12. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See MINN. ISSUES RESOURCE GUIDES: STATE BUDGET PROCESS, supra note 14. 
 22. NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS, NAT’L CONF. OF 
STATE 
LEGIS. 2 (2010), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010
.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RLB-4XPT].  
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While the balanced budget requirement is long-standing, the 
frequency and severity of budgeting disputes between the legislative and 
executive branches have increased significantly. At least nineteen states 
have started new fiscal years without a final budget since 2002.23 Five of 
these states—Michigan, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Tennessee, and 
Minnesota—have experienced partial government shutdowns as a result.24 
The federal government, even without a balanced budget requirement, 
also has experienced nineteen funding gaps with varying degrees of severity 
since 1976.25 While this article was being written, the federal government 
endured the nineteenth and longest partial shutdown, lasting thirty-four 
days, in United States history.26 
Though there has been an uptick in government gridlock litigation in 
recent years, it is not an all-together new phenomenon. There are at least 
two other instances of partial government shutdowns or related litigation in 
Minnesota history prior to the Brayton and In re Temporary Funding 
cases.  
III. THE RISE OF MINNESOTA STATE GOVERNMENT GRIDLOCK 
Differing opinions and divided government are hallmarks of 
democratic governance. Minnesota is no different. Since 1901, the state 
government in Minnesota has been divided for thirty-two out of the sixty-
three biennial sessions.27 In the past thirty years, divided government has 
become the norm.28 Single party control in Minnesota has occurred only 
twice since 1990.29  
 
 23. See MINN. ISSUES RESOURCE GUIDES: STATE BUDGET PROCESS, supra note 14. 
 24. LATE STATE BUDGETS, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Aug. 27, 2010), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/late-state-budgets.aspx [https://perma.cc/BBP6-
WC39]. 
 25. See Ryan Struyk & Joyce Tseng, The History of US Government Shutdowns in 1 
Chart, CABLE NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 3, 2018, 8:13 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/13/politics/us-government-shutdowns-budget-
chart/index.html [https://perma.cc/3DMW-D8FL]. 
 26. Mihir Zaveri, Guilbert Gates, & Karen Zraick, The Government Shutdown Was 
the Longest Ever. Here’s the History., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/09/us/politics/longest-government-
shutdown.html [https://perma.cc/USF3-XMET]. 
 27. More than fifty percent of all Minnesota legislative sessions held since 1901 have 
been divided. See LEGISLATIVE PARTY CONTROL, supra note 15. 
 28. See id.  
 29. Id. 
5
Gearin: The “Law of Ramsey County” – Reflections of a Trial Judge on Stat
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
  
2019] THE “LAW OF RAMSEY COUNTY” 507 
A. Averted Partial Government Shutdown in 2001  
From the standpoint of political party affiliation, Minnesota’s 2001 
Legislative Session was marked by a truly divided government. 
Republicans held a majority in the House of Representatives.30 The 
Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party (DFL) controlled the State Senate.31 Jesse 
Ventura of the Independence Party occupied the Governor’s Office.32 
Despite a state budget surplus, the legislature and governor struggled to 
reach an agreement on how to spend it.33  
When it became clear that a government shutdown might occur, 
Minnesota Attorney General Mike Hatch petitioned the Ramsey County 
District Court on June 20, 2001, asking that the core government functions 
receive funding and authority to operate if the legislature did not enact 
appropriations by the end of the 2001 fiscal year.34 The petition 
acknowledged that article XI, section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution 
provides: “no money shall be paid out of the treasury of this State except 
in pursuance of an appropriation by law” and that article IV gives the 
Minnesota Legislature the power of appropriation.35 However, the petition 
also asserted that state government is mandated by the Minnesota 
Constitution, the United States Constitution, and federal law pursuant to 
the Supremacy Clause36 to perform “certain services which are ‘core or 
inherent’ functions [that] cannot be abridged by the legislative branch.”37 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. See also Laura McCallum, Politics on a Three-Legged Stool, MINN. PUB. 
RADIO (May 3, 2001), http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/200105/03_mccallu
ml_budget/ [https://perma.cc/JQJ2-KHCQ]. 
 33. The State Senate wanted to use half of the anticipated budget surplus for 
transportation, health care and higher-education projects. Governor Ventura and the State 
House of Representatives wanted to use the entire surplus to issue rebates to the public. 
See McCallum, supra note 32. 
 34. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting Motion for 
Temporary Funding, In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Exec. Branch 
(Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. June 29, 2001) (Cohen, C.J.) (No. C9-01-5725), 
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2009/other/090583.pdf [https://perma.cc/33X6-974N] 
[hereinafter “District Court Order (June 2001)”]; Michael Khoo, With Shutdown Averted, 
Legislature Adjourns, MINN. PUB. RADIO (June 
30, 2001), http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/200106/30_khoom_session/ 
[https://perma.cc/X28M-6L8E]. 
 35. District Court Order (June 2001), supra note 34, at 6 (quoting MINN. CONST. art. 
XI, § 1). 
 36. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the land; and 
6
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The petition outlined broad definitions for the meaning of “core” or 
“essential” government services, relying on criteria previously articulated 
by the federal Office of Management and Budget and the United States 
Attorney General during a federal government shutdown.38 Applying this 
criteria to Minnesota, Attorney General Hatch requested a declaration that 
(1) the executive branch must carry out core government functions as 
required by the Minnesota Constitution, United States Constitution, and 
federal law; (2) the state treasury shall issue checks and process funds 
necessary to pay for these obligations; and (3) that each government entity 
be allowed to determine its own core functions.39 The petition also called 
for the appointment of a special master to resolve any issues relating to 
core function determinations and payment for these services.40 
The following day, June 21, Ramsey County Chief Judge Lawrence 
Cohen set a hearing for June 29, two days before the start of the next fiscal 
year.41 At that hearing, Judge Cohen issued the order granting the attorney 
general’s motion for temporary funding, with payments to be made from 
the state treasury for core functions from July 1, 2001, through July 23, 
2001, until the legislature enacted the necessary appropriations bills or 
until another order from the court.42 
In response to concerns that a court order would upset the balance of 
power between the three branches, Attorney General Hatch noted that 
“there is a precedent for one branch of government [to] tread[] on the turf 
 
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of 
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 37. Petition of Attorney General Mike Hatch at 4, In re Temporary Funding of Core 
Functions of the Executive Branch of the State of Minnesota (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. June 
29, 2001) (No. C9-01-5725), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2009/other/090583.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VDV9-5LUN]. 
 38. Id. at 5. The criteria for what portions of government should receive funding and 
the authority to operate was three-fold: (1) services necessary for national security; (2) 
services necessary to perform contract obligations; and (3) services necessary to protect life 
and property. Id. 
 39. District Court Order (June 2001), supra note 34, at 7. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Peter S. Wattson, Power of the Purse in Minnesota, MINN. SENATE 
COUNSEL § IV at 13–14 (July 17, 2017), 
https://www.senate.mn/departments/scr/treatise/Power_of_the_Purse/Power_of_the_Purse.
pdf [https://perma.cc/TM5P-W3BT] (citing In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions 
of the Exec. Branch (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. June 29, 2001) (Cohen, C.J.) (No. C9-01-
5725)).  
 42. District Court Order (June 2001), supra note 34, at 7. 
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of another.”43 The attorney general reasoned, “[i]n the south with 
desegregation, there were many times when courts would have to order 
that school districts build schools so that kids could get educated. They 
weren’t financed or appropriated by the legislature, the executive branch 
wasn't building them, the courts ordered that it be done[.]”44  
Ultimately, Chief Judge Cohen’s order was moot because the 
legislature and governor agreed on a budget deal the next day, averting the 
shutdown.45 However, the impasse did create a template for future 
government gridlock: the legislature and governor unable to reach a 
compromise followed by intervention by the attorney general. It also may 
have communicated to the legislative and executive branches that judicial 
intervention would soften the consequences of future budgetary 
brinksmanship. Regardless of the implications of Judge Cohen’s order or 
the lessons learned by the other branches, the pattern repeated itself only a 
few years later. 
B. Partial Government Shutdown in 2005 
During the 2005 Legislative Session, Republican Governor Tim 
Pawlenty and the DFL-controlled legislature failed to timely enact 
legislation authorizing funding for the largest spending areas: health, 
human services, education, and transportation.46 Between the May 
constitutional adjournment date and June 30, the legislature and governor 
were unable to reach a compromise agreement that would stop a partial 
government shutdown. The failure of the parties to reach an agreement by 
July 1 marked the first time in Minnesota history that the legislature failed 
to enact the necessary appropriation and revenue bills before the start of 
the new biennium.47 
In the months leading up to the partial government shutdown, it 
became evident that a compromise agreement was unlikely. Attorney 
General Hatch and Governor Pawlenty both filed petitions on June 15, 
2005, requesting that the Ramsey County District Court authorize funding 
 
 43. Elizabeth Stawicki, Judge Steps Onto Legislature’s Turf, MINN. PUB. RADIO 
(June 29, 2001), http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/200106/29_stawickie_judg
e/ [https://perma.cc/R5RQ-QCCL]. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Khoo, supra note 34. 
 46. See Wattson, supra note 41, at 13, 14; Tom Scheck, Minnesota State Shutdown 
Ends with Early-Morning Deal, MINN. PUB. RADIO (July 9, 2005), 
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2005/07/09_scheckt_day9/ 
[https://perma.cc/J3EX-PXLX]. 
 47. Wattson, supra note 41. 
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for certain core government functions in anticipation of a possible partial 
shutdown on July 1.48 Attorney General Hatch again argued that the 
legislature had failed to fulfill its duty to provide appropriations, leaving 
executive branch officials, the agencies, and other government entities 
unable to carry out their mandates to provide required key functions and 
services for Minnesotans.49 Thus, a judicial order was necessary to avert 
the looming emergency and ensure that critical services required by the 
Minnesota Constitution, the United States Constitution, federal statute or 
regulation would continue during a shutdown.50 Governor Pawlenty’s 
petition relied in part on a principle announced in a 1976 Minnesota case 
that addressed the separation of powers, stating that when “‘established 
and reasonable procedures have failed’51 to result in sufficient 
appropriations for constitutionally-mandated functions, this Court . . . may 
provide relief to aggrieved officials.”52  
Through their petitions, both Governor Pawlenty and Attorney 
General Hatch further sought a declaration that the legislature’s failure to 
approve appropriations necessitated that the governor and executive 
branch officials have authorization to carry out “core functions” and 
“critical services,” and that the finance commissioner have authority to 
issue checks to ensure payment for these functions and services.53 The 
attorney general also requested the appointment of a special master for the 
purpose of hearing disputes and providing recommendations to the court 
for any additional funding.54 
On June 23, Ramsey County Chief Judge Johnson ordered that the 
state continue funding programs and services as laid out in the “core and 
critical functions list,” noting that the court was not making any 
determination about the number of employees required to carry out those 
 
 48. Petition of Governor Tim Pawlenty at 3, In re Temporary Funding of Core 
Functions of the Exec. Branch (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. June 15, 2005) (No. CO-05-
5928), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2005/other/050414/Petitions_by_Tim_Pawlenty.p
df [https://perma.cc/6NTG-YFQD] [hereinafter “Pawlenty Petition”]; Petition of Attorney 
General Mike Hatch, at 6, In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Exec. 
Branch (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. June 15, 2005) (No. CO-05-
5928), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2005/other/050414/Petitions_by_Mike_Hatch.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X9YB-SM38] [hereinafter “Hatch Petition (June 2005)”]. 
 49. Hatch Petition (June 2005), supra note 48, at 2. 
 50. Pawlenty Petition, supra note 48, at 3 (internal footnotes and citations omitted); 
Hatch Petition (June 2005), supra note 48, at 6. 
 51. Clerk of Courts Comp. for Lyon Cty. v. Lyon Cty. Comm’rs, 241 N.W.2d 781 
(Minn. 1976). 
 52. Pawlenty Petition, supra note 48, at 2. 
 53. Id. at 7; Hatch Petition (June 2005), supra note 48, at 7. 
 54. Hatch Petition (June 2005), supra note 48, at 7–8. 
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functions.55 Chief Judge Johnson’s order relied on the principle that each 
of the six executive branch constitutional officers specified in article X of 
the Minnesota Constitution are required to “perform certain core 
functions which are an inherent part of their Offices. Performance of these 
core functions may not be abridged.”56 Moreover, the failure to fund these 
core services would nullify the offices in violation of the Minnesota 
Constitution.57 Echoing Attorney General Hatch’s core function criteria 
from 2001, the district court concluded that a “critical service” was one 
necessary to “protect the lives, health and safety of those residing in 
Minnesota; or, safeguard public property against loss or casualty during 
any period in which government services may be interrupted.”58  
The order directed an appointed special master to determine 
whether particular government programs constituted “critical services.” 
Then, only after the special master’s approval, the finance commissioner 
would make payments from the state treasury for continued operations.59 
The order’s effect was immediate. Per its terms, the order would remain 
in effect until July 23, 2005, the enactment of a complete state budget, or 
further order of the court.60 Notably, there were no appeals or challenges 
made to the order at that time. 
The order remained in effect for nine days until the legislature and 
governor enacted a “lights on” temporary spending bill that allowed the 
non-funded agencies and programs to receive the same amounts they were 
allocated in the previous appropriation bills.61 The legislature and governor 
finally reached agreement on July 14. Attempting to blunt the 
constitutionally questionable nature of court-ordered treasury 
disbursements, or lessen the public criticisms of the shutdown, the 
legislature included language that made the two-year appropriations 
retroactive to July 1, 2005.62  
 
 55. In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Exec. Branch, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting Motion for Temporary Funding, at Ex. B, 
(Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. June 23, 2005) (No. C9-05-5928), 
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2005/other/050414/Order_by_Judge_Gregg_Johnson.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZW3J-773V] [hereinafter “District Court Order (June 2005)”]. 
 56. Id. at 7 (citing State ex. rel. Mattson v. Kiedrowski, 391 N.W. 2d 777 (Minn. 
1986)).  
 57. District Court Order (June 2005), supra note 55, at 7. 
 58. Pawlenty Petition, supra note 48, at 3–4. 
 59. District Court Order (June 2005), supra note 55, at 8. 
 60. Id. at 9. 
 61. 2005 Minn. Laws 2273. 
 62. State ex rel. Sviggum v. Ingison (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. Mar. 3, 2006) (No. 62-C9-
05-9413), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2005/other/050414/C9-05-
9413_Order_and_Memorandum.pdf [https://perma.cc/DX33-GZ95]. Each of these bills 
10
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This language became important when legislators filed quo warranto63 
petitions to stop future state fund disbursements by the executive branch 
without an appropriation. The petitions were intended to spark appellate 
review of the underlying constitutional issues that surface when courts are 
asked to order appropriations as a perceived last resort.64  
On August 31, 2005, thirteen state legislators filed a petition for a writ 
of quo warranto in the Minnesota Supreme Court against Finance 
Commissioner Peggy Ingison, challenging the constitutionality of court 
ordered expenditures.65 They sought an order “requiring [Commissioner 
Ingison] and her successors to cease and desist from any further 
disbursements of state funds at the end of the fiscal biennium without 
appropriation by law.”66 The justices concluded that the reasons provided 
by petitioners for initiating their action in the Supreme Court were 
insufficient to overcome the requirement that quo warranto proceedings 
begin in district court. The petition was dismissed without prejudice on 
September 9, 2005.67 
On September 28, 2005, the legislators refiled their petition for a writ 
of quo warranto in Ramsey County District Court. Their petition asked 
the district court to issue a writ of quo warranto to Finance Commissioner 
Ingison requiring her to show by what constitutional authority she 
disbursed state funds at the end of a biennium without an appropriation by 
law; or in absence of such showing, to require her and her successor to 
 
contained the following language with minor differences, but with the same effect: 
“Appropriations in this act are effective retroactively from July 1, 2005, and supersede and 
replace funding authorized by the Ramsey District Court . . . as well as by Laws 2005 1st 
Spec Session Chapter 2, which provided necessary funding through July 14, 2005[.]” See 
generally 2005 Minn. Laws 2454 (health and human services); 2005 Minn. Laws 2790 
(education); 2005 Minn. Laws 2941 (transportation). 
 63. A writ of quo warranto is a proceeding that “inquire[s] [into] whether authority 
existed to justify or authorize certain acts of a public character or interest.” The Latin 
translation is roughly “by what authority” or “by what warrant?” Quo Warranto, Black’s 
Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (quoting CHARLES HERMAN KINNANE, A FIRST BOOK ON 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 662 (2d ed. 1952)). 
 64. Wattson, supra note 41. 
 65. Sup. Ct. Or. Denying Pet. Quo Warranto, State ex rel. Sviggum v. Ingison (Minn. 
Sept. 9, 2005) (No. A05-1742) (“[Petitioners] seek an order requiring respondent and her 
successors to cease and desist from any further disbursements of state funds at the end of 
the fiscal biennium without an appropriation by law.”), 
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2005/other/050414/A05-
1742_SupCt_Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5VH-KW8T]. 
 66. Sup. Ct. Or. Denying Pet. Quo Warranto, supra note 65, at 1–2. 
 67. Id. at 5. 
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cease and desist from any further future state funding disbursements 
without an appropriation by law.68  
Chief Judge Johnson, who issued the prior order, denied this writ in 
its entirety, reasoning that the legislators were precluded from bringing 
their claim because “the writ by its very nature is not available to challenge 
past conduct. The writ is intended to apply to situations involving a 
continuing course of unauthorized usurpation of authority”69 and here, 
there was no continuing, unauthorized usurpation.70 The court also wrote 
that petitioners failed to meet the standard that the “challenged conduct is 
capable of repetition, yet likely to evade judicial review” established in 
Elzle v. Commissioner of Public Safety.71 In a nod to the issue’s moot 
nature, Chief Judge Johnson further explained that the legislature 
ultimately enacted language ratifying the funding ordered by the district 
court.72 
Chief Judge Johnson next defended the constitutionality of the 
original decision to provide funding for core government services. Chief 
Judge Johnson reasoned, “[t]he constitution of the state of Minnesota . . . 
is not a ‘suicide pact’ and must be interpreted to further its principle 
purpose of preserving the state.”73 Chief Judge Johnson explained, “[t]he 
executive and judicial branches must retain the right and duty to respond 
to such emergencies as presented here by the inability of the legislative 
branch to fulfill its constitutional duty.”74 He added judicial intervention in 
 
 68. Brief of Petitioners and Appendix Vol. 1 of 2 at 8–9, State ex rel. Sviggum v. 
Ingison (Dist. Ct. Ramsey Cty. 2005) (No. 62-C9-05-9413) (providing chronological 
history). 
 69. State ex rel., 62-C9-05-9413 at 5. See also State ex. rel. Lommen v. Gravlin, 295 
N.W.2d 654 (Minn. 1941); State ex. rel. Groybach v. Common School District No. 65, 54 
N.W.2d 130 (Minn. 1952) (“[T]he writ of quo warranto is not allowable as preventive of, 
or remedy for, official misconduct and cannot be employed to test the legality of the official 
action of public or corporate officers.”). 
 70. Id. at 5. 
 71. Id. at 6 (citing Elzle v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 298 N.W.2d 29 (Minn. 
1980); Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 2005)). 
 72. Id. at 3. 
 73. State ex rel. Sviggum v. Ingison, at 8 (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. Mar. 3, 2006) (No. 
62-C9-05-941) (citing Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W. 3d 852, 873–77 (Ky. 2005) 
(holding that constitutional separation of powers provisions must be interpreted to further 
its purpose of supporting an enduring republic)), 
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2005/other/050414/C9-05-
9413_Order_and_Memorandum.pdf [https://perma.cc/DX33-GZ95].  
 74. Id.  
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this case “was done with caution in order to ensure funding for core 
services of government related to life, health and safety.”75  
The legislators appealed Chief Judge Johnson’s dismissal to the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals.76 The court of appeals largely affirmed the 
district court’s decision except for the conclusion that the action was 
barred by the doctrine of laches.77 The court reasoned that even though 
the legislators may have foregone an opportunity to participate in the initial 
proceeding, it could not “conclude that they unreasonably delayed the 
assertion of their rights to question the constitutionality of the resulting 
decision.”78 
Acknowledging that the litigation’s purpose was to obtain appellate 
review of the Ramsey County District Court, which had been fruitless thus 
far, the court of appeals decision characterized the action as “seeking a 
declaration that the funds the commissioner disbursed under district 
court’s authorization and without legislative appropriation were 
unconstitutional and an order requiring the commissioner to cease 
disbursements.”79 However, the court of appeals ultimately decided not to 
address these questions, citing the plain language of the legislature’s 
retroactive appropriations bills.80 The court of appeals stated that, “[t]he 
judiciary does not have the constitutional power to ‘relegislate’ the effect of 
the legislature’s appropriations decisions.”81  
Thus, the legislature successfully superseded the district court in 
authorizing the executive disbursements.82 In other words, it was as if Judge 
Johnson’s order never existed. The court then went on to urge the 
legislature to pass legislation that would address future budget impasses. 
The court explained, “it is the legislature and not the judiciary that has the 
institutional competency to devise a prospective plan for resolving future 
political impasses.”83  
Judge Harriet Lansing, writing for the court, gently suggested two 
ways that the legislature could prevent another judicially-mandated 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. See State ex rel. Sviggum v. Hanson, 732 N.W.2d 312, 315–17 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2007). 
 77. Id. at 324.  
 78. Id. at 318. 
 79. Id. at 316. 
 80. Id. at 323. 
 81. See State ex rel. Sviggum v. Hanson, 732 N.W.2d 312, 323 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2007).  
 82. See id. 
 83. Id. 
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disbursement of public funds during a budgetary impasse.84 First, the 
legislature could create an emergency fund to keep the government 
functioning.85 Second, the legislature could enact “a statute setting forth the 
procedures to be followed during a budgetary impasse.”86  
However, between the issuance of this opinion and the next budget 
impasse in 2011, no legislation was enacted to replace the practice of the 
attorney general filing lawsuits in Ramsey County District Court asking for 
judicial involvement when the other branches were unwilling to settle 
budgetary differences. That legislative inaction left “the law of Ramsey 
County” intact and the constitutional arguments unresolved. While the 
court of appeals declined to rule on the constitutional issue, it 
acknowledged the issue’s importance in dicta: “[w]e recognize the 
legislators’ compelling argument that the commissioner’s court-approved 
disbursements interfered with their appropriations power and improperly 
affected the dynamics of the legislative process during the special 
session.”87 This statement likely was little consolation to the legislators who 
sought the review.  
IV.  GRIDLOCK REACHES RAMSEY COUNTY COURT AGAIN 
A. Brayton v. Pawlenty in 2010 
A few years later, I dealt with my first government gridlock case as 
Ramsey County Chief Judge. The facts differed somewhat from the 2001 
and 2005 shutdown cases. Instead of the legislature and governor failing to 
agree on spending, they agreed to a state budget that was almost certain to 
exceed projected state revenues—which is exactly what happened.88  
As discussed above, Minnesota state government operates on a two-
year budget cycle.89 Each biennial budget is comprised of revenues and 
expenditures established in bills passed by the legislature and signed into 
law by the governor.90 Minnesota Management and Budget is required to 
regularly prepare a series of anticipated revenue and expenditure 
 
 84. See id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 359–60 (Minn. 2010) (summarizing 
the history of the 2009 legislative session culminating in the failure of the legislature and 
governor to agree on a projected balanced budget). 
 89. See generally supra Part II. 
 90. See generally supra Part II. 
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forecasts.91 To develop each forecast, the department relies on reports 
from macroeconomic consultants, anticipated demographic changes, and 
additional analysis from the state economist.92  
The November 2008 forecast for the 2010–2011 biennium was 
bleak. Minnesota Management and Budget projected that the state 
government would have a $4.847 billion budget deficit.93 The department 
came to essentially the same conclusion in February 2009.94 These budget 
forecasts made clear that expenditure cuts or revenue increases were 
necessary to balance the 2010–2011 budget as required by the Minnesota 
Constitution.95 
Considering this forecast, Governor Pawlenty’s proposed budget 
resolved the expected deficit through expenditure reductions.96 During the 
legislative session, the legislature passed appropriations bills between May 
4 and May 18 that reduced expenditures, but it was still not enough to 
overcome the forecasted deficit.97 To resolve the balance, the legislature 
passed a revenue bill that would have solved the remaining shortfall by 
increasing taxes. The governor vetoed that bill on May 9, which the 
legislature failed to override.98  
On May 14, Governor Pawlenty announced at a controversial press 
conference that if a compromise budget deal was not reached, there would 
 
 91. See generally supra Part II. The Minnesota Department of Finance was merged 
with the Minnesota Department of Employee Relations to create Minnesota Management 
and Budget in 2008. The Finance Commissioner, who was a frequent party in these earlier 
gridlock cases, would be replaced by the Management and Budget Commissioner in the 
later proceedings. See Press Release, Office of the Governor, Tim Pawlenty, Governor 
Pawlenty Announces Merger of Employee Relations Department Completed on Schedule 
(May 30, 2008), 
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2010/other/101582/www.governor.state.mn.us/mediacent
er/pressreleases/2008/PROD008976.html [https://perma.cc/DEJ2-YKXJ]. 
 92. MINN. STAT. § 16A.103 (2017). See also Forecast Overview, MINNESOTA 
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, https://mn.gov/mmb/forecast/overview/ 
[https://perma.cc/LD74-2DC9] (describing the state of Minnesota’s budget forecasting 
procedures). 
 93. MINN. MGMT. AND BUDGET, MINNESOTA FINANCIAL REPORT: NOVEMBER 
FORECAST (2008), https://mn.gov/mmb/assets/Budget-Economic-Forecast-
Nov2008_tcm1059-228633.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2R7-XLNJ]. 
 94. See MINN. MGMT. AND BUDGET, MINNESOTA FINANCIAL REPORT: FEBRUARY 
FORECAST (2009), https://mn.gov/mmb/assets/Budget-Economic-Forecast-
Feb2009_tcm1059-228598.pdf [https://perma.cc/45QY-3HA8]. 
 95. See id. 
 96. Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn. 2010). 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id. at 359–60. 
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be neither a special session nor a shutdown.99 Instead, he would use the 
state’s unallotment statute to balance the budget.100 The unallotment statute 
provides the executive branch authority to reduce unexpended allotments 
when the Minnesota Management and Budget Commissioner determines 
that “probable receipts for the general fund will be less than anticipated, 
and that the amount available for the remainder of the biennium will be 
less than needed.”101 The statute does not define or put timelines on the 
phrases “less than anticipated” or “less than needed.”102 
On the last day of the session, May 18, the legislature ignored the 
governor’s warning and passed another revenue bill to address the 
remaining $2.7 billion projected deficit after the enactment of the 
appropriations bills.103 The governor vetoed the bill.104 As a result, a 
projected $2.7 billion deficit remained unresolved by the legislature—
setting the stage for the lawsuit that followed.105 
On November 3, 2009, Deanna Brayton filed suit in Ramsey County 
District Court against Governor Pawlenty, Minnesota Management and 
Budget, the Minnesota Department of Human Services, and the 
Minnesota Department of Revenue seeking a temporary injunction on 
behalf of low-income residents who received Minnesota Supplemental 
Special Diet Assistance.106 State payments to the program had stopped two 
days earlier on November 1 because the governor’s unallotment plan 
significantly reduced the available appropriations for the Minnesota 
Department of Human Services from the levels enacted in May.107 The 
 
 99. Mark Brunswick & Mike Kaszuba, Pawlenty Issues Ultimatum on State 
Budget, STAR TRIB. (May 15, 2009, 10:06 AM), http://www.startribune.com/pawlenty-
issues-ultimatum-on-state-budget/45042272/ [https://perma.cc/R7QP-3DXG]. 
 100. See id.; MINN. STAT. § 16A.152(4) (2017). 
 101. MINN. STAT. § 16A.152(4) (2017). 
 102. See MINN. STAT. § 16A.011 (2017); MINN. STAT. § 16A.152 (2017). 
 103. See Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Minn. 2010). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. at 359–60. 
 106. Class Action Complaint of Plaintiffs, Brayton v. Pawlenty (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. 
Dec. 30, 2009) (No. 62-CV-09-1169), 
http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/2/Public/Civil/1%20Pawlenty%201139/Summons_an
d_Complaint_Nov_3_09.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP6A-EXA4] [hereinafter “Brayton Class 
Action Complaint”]. 
 107. See id. Unallotment is a procedure by which previously appropriated funding is 
held back to ensure the state budget remains balanced between legislative sessions. See id. 
It has been used by at least three Minnesota governors since 1980. Governor Pawlenty’s 
2009 unallotment plan would have restricted $2.68 billion in previously approved state 
funding. See generally Colbey Sullivan and Elizabeth Klarqvist, Unallotment: Executive 
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complaint asked the district court to order the executive branch to 
reinstate funding for the Special Diet Plan Assistance program during the 
litigation.108  
On December 30, 2009, an order was filed enjoining the defendants 
from reducing the allotment to the program retroactive to November 1, 
2009.109 The order found that while the unallotment statute was 
constitutional, the governor had used his powers under this statute in an 
unconstitutional manner, given the unique facts of the case discussed 
above.110 
The unallotment statute’s constitutionality previously had been 
addressed by the Minnesota Court of Appeals ruling in Rukavina v. 
Pawlenty, which held that the unallotment statute was constitutional.111 
Because of this controlling precedent, the decision not to rule the statute 
itself unconstitutional was an easy one. It was, as the court reasoned in 
their injunction order, “the specific manner in which the Governor 
exercised his unallotment authority that trod upon the constitutional 
power of the Legislature.”112 Moreover, the “authority of the Governor to 
unallot [was] . . . intended to save the state in times of a previously 
unforeseen budget crisis.” 113 It was “not meant to be used as a weapon by 
the executive branch to break” a budget impasse or “to rewrite the 
appropriations bill.”114 Because the projected budget shortfall “was neither 
unknown nor unanticipated when the appropriation bills became law,” the 
 
Branch Power to Reduce Spending to Avoid a Deficit, MINN. H.R., RESEARCH DEP’T 
(2018),  
https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/unallot.pdf [https://perma.cc/33JT-Z6CU]; 
MINN. ISSUES RES. GUIDES: UNALLOTMENT, MINN. LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBRARY (2018),  
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/lrl/guides/guides?issue=unallotment [https://perma.cc/4LRB-
EYD2]. 
 108. See Brayton Class Action Complaint, at 25. 
 109. See Order, Brayton v. Pawlenty, (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. Dec. 30, 2009) (Gearin, 
C.J.) (62-CV-09-11693), 
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/webcontent/lrl/guides/Unallotment/order2009.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M3LQ-RAQQ] [hereinafter “Brayton Order (December 2009)”]. 
 110. See id. 
 111. See Rukavina v. Pawlenty, 684 N.W.2d 525, 535 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), rev. 
denied (Minn. Oct. 19, 2004) (“We conclude that Minn. Stat. § 16A.152, does not reflect 
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, but only enables the executive to protect 
the state from financial crisis in a manner designated by the legislature.”). 
 112. Brayton Order (December 2009), at 4. 
 113. Id. at 4. 
 114. Id. 
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executive branch’s use of the unallotment authority was invalid and 
violated separation of powers principles.115  
The parties agreed that the defendants’ motion to dismiss the lawsuit 
should be denied and requested final judgment for the plaintiffs be 
entered instead of continuing the matter for further proceedings in the trial 
court. This paved the way for an expedited appeal to the Minnesota 
Supreme Court.116 The supreme court upheld the trial court ruling, in a 
four-to-three decision. The decision was upheld, not because it found that 
the governor’s actions were unconstitutional because they violated 
separation of powers principles, but because the governor’s actions 
exceeded the statutory authority granted to him by the legislature.117 The 
decision followed the established appellate court principle of avoiding a 
constitutional ruling when there is another basis on which the case can be 
decided.118  
Appellants argued that the unallotment statute gives the executive 
branch authority to modify spending decisions regardless of whether the 
shortfall results from lower revenues than expected, veto of a revenue bill, 
or the governor’s decision not to sign adequate revenue legislation passed 
by both branches of the legislature.119 The court rejected that interpretation 
of the statute because it would give the executive branch too broad a role 
in the creation of biennial budgets.120 The legislature and governor never 
reached an agreement on what amounts should be appropriated and if any 
revenues should be raised to achieve a balanced budget in 2009.121 
Appropriations bills were passed and signed, but revenue bills were not—
meaning that a balanced budget for the 2010-2011 biennium was never 
enacted.122 The court held that the statute only provides the executive 
branch authority to address an unanticipated budget deficit after the 
legislative and executive branches have enacted a balanced budget.123 
Applying this reasoning, the Special Diet Program unallotment was found 
to be unlawful and void because the 2009 budget-making process was 
never completed.124  
 
 115. Id. at 6. 
 116. See id. 
 117. Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn. 2010). 
 118. In re Sentry-Haugen, 583 N.W. 2d 266, 269 n.3 (Minn. 1998). 
 119. Brayton, 781 N.W.2d at 367. 
 120. See id. at 368. 
 121. See generally id. at 359–62 (resolving the unallotment authority of the executive 
branch but never addressing the question of how to achieve a balanced budget in 2009). 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. at 368. 
 124. See id. 
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The supreme court majority also noted how the governor’s actions 
represented a threat to separation of powers.125 The court explained, “[t]he 
statute does not shift to the executive branch a broad budget-making 
authority allowing the executive branch to address a deficit that remains 
after a legislative session because the legislative and executive branches 
have not resolved their differences.”126 Brayton was the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s first substantive ruling after a decade of litigation on 
budget conflicts between the legislative and executive branches. It 
established a meaningful limitation on executive authority in the budget 
process—denying the governor the ability to use the unallotment statute to 
avoid a government shutdown during an impasse.  
B. In re Temporary Funding Litigation in 2011 
For most Minnesotans, the 2011 government shutdown began at 
midnight on July 1. For me, it started six months earlier, when Politics in 
Minnesota published its annual January legislative session preview. The 
cover article was entitled “The Decider” featuring my photo. It predicted if 
the legislative and executive branches failed to resolve the looming budget 
issues, the Ramsey County Chief Judge would preside over any 
government shutdown litigation.127 As chief judge, I knew that the 
prediction was accurate. I did not relish the possibility. I already had 
handled the politically sensitive unallotment case, served on the canvassing 
board in the 2008 Franken-Coleman Senate election recount, and led the 
Ramsey County courts during the 2008 Republican National Convention, 
held in St. Paul, and its aftermath.128 
By mid-June 2011 it was evident that the discussions between DFL 
Governor Dayton and the Republican-controlled legislature were 
deadlocked. The governor stated that he would not call a special session of 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. See also id. at 369 (Page J., concurring) (“Under our definition of pure 
legislative power, the sweeping discretion granted by section 16A.152, subdivision 4, to 
modify and negate legislative spending decisions raises serious separation of powers 
concerns.”). 
 127. Jake Grovum, Gearin: ‘I’ve Had the Chief Judgeship From Hell’, MINNESOTA 
LAWYER (July 22, 2011), https://minnlawyer.com/2011/07/22/gearin-
%E2%80%98i%E2%80%99ve-had-the-chief-judgeship-from-hell%E2%80%99/ 
[https://perma.cc/LKY4-N5HG]. 
 128. Id. More than 800 people were arrested during the 2008 Republican National 
Convention in St. Paul, including 300 people on the first day of the event. Colin Moynihan, 
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the legislature to pass appropriation bills in the absence of a compromise. 
Not unexpectedly, a “shutdown” funding lawsuit was filed in Ramsey 
County.129  
Like the prior lawsuits handled by Chief Judges Cohen and Johnson, 
the attorney general initiated it. After discussions between legislative 
leaders and the governor failed to produce any significant movement 
towards compromise, on June 13, Attorney General Lori Swanson filed a 
petition seeking an order directing state government to fund executive 
branch core functions.130 It also asked the court to appoint a special master 
to resolve any issues concerning the order’s terms.131  
An order to show cause was signed and a hearing was set for June 
23.132 The order uncorked a deluge of phone calls and letters to my 
chambers urging me to order continued funding for specific government 
services and programs. The dispute placed me in the difficult position of 
applying the law to a political conflict with real and immediate 
consequences. The calls included dozens of pleas to ensure that the 
animals at the Oliver H. Kelly Farm, run by the Minnesota Historical 
Society, and the Minnesota Zoo received food and care. There were 
dozens of calls from businesses and individuals who were unable to renew 
the licenses they needed to make a living. Construction companies 
worried they would be unable to complete road projects before winter. 
Worried citizens called wondering if they would get state processed social 
service payments, if state parks would be open, or if their state jobs would 
be considered critical. 
Governor Dayton filed his response to Attorney General Swanson on 
the same day as the order to show cause was issued.133 Unlike Governor 
 
 129. Petition of Attorney General Lori Swanson, In re Temporary Funding of Core 




 130. Id. at 7–8. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Motion of the State of Minnesota to Consolidate at 3, In re Temporary 
Funding of Core Functions of the Exec. Branch of the State of Minn. (Ramsey Cty. Dist. 
Ct. June 30, 2011) (No. 62-CV-11-5203), 
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2011/other/110561/A11-
1107_AGs_Motion_to_Consolidate.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AXY-K82K]. 
 133. See Response of the Governor to the Petition of the Attorney General, In re 
Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Exec. Branch (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. June 
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Pawlenty in 2001 and 2005, Governor Dayton opposed the petition 
despite recognizing that “[a] government shutdown would threaten the 
lives and safety of the people of Minnesota.”134 He urged the court to order 
the parties into mediation and forego issuing any other order for relief 
unless and until mediation failed.135 He also argued that the office of the 
governor has a number of inherent and statutory powers and that if the 
legislature fails to pass appropriations bills that are either signed by the 
governor or have the support of a two-thirds majority in each house 
necessary to override a gubernatorial veto, he would use these executive 
powers to fund core government functions.136  
Following the initial hearing on Attorney General Swanson’s petition, 
an order was issued denying both the motion to order the parties into 
mediation and the motion to stay the proceedings.137 The House of 
Representatives and the State Senate appeared through counsel at that 
hearing and opposed mandatory mediation.138 The June 27 order denying 
the request that the courts direct the executive and legislative branches to 
engage in mediation cited article III of the Minnesota Constitution and 
State ex. rel. Birkeland v. Christianson.139 In Birkeland, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court explained:  
The three departments of state government, the legislative, 
executive, and judicial, are independent of each other. Neither 
department can control, coerce, or restrain the action or 
nonaction of either of the others in the exercise of any official 
power or duty conferred by the Constitution, or by valid law, 
involving the exercise of discretion.140 
The funding order was filed on June 29, which was the latest I 
believed I could delay in the hope that the other branches would resolve 
the issue.141 The order directed Minnesota Management and Budget to 
 
 134. Id. at 1.  
 135. See id. 
 136. See id. at 6–7. 
 137. Order Denying Mediation at 1, In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions of 




 138. Id.  
 139. See id. at 2 (citing State ex. rel. Birkeland v. Christianson, 229 N.W. 313, 314 
(Minn. 1930)). 
 140. State ex. rel. Birkeland, 229 N.W. 313 at 314. 
 141. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting Motion for 
Temporary Funding, In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Executive Branch 
of the State of Minnesota (Ramsey Cty. Dist. Ct. June 29, 2011) (No. 62-CV-11-5203). 
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issue checks, process funds, and make payments necessary to carry out the 
performance of the critical functions of government identified in the 
order.142 It went into effect at midnight on June 30 and was scheduled to 
expire on July 31, or earlier if a budget was enacted before that date.143 
To justify the disbursements that had not been appropriated by the 
legislature, the order relied on the totality of the Minnesota Constitution 
and Minnesota cases addressing similar issues. The analysis centered on 
article I, section 1, which states that “[g]overnment is instituted for the 
security, benefit, and protection of the people in whom all political power 
is inherent” and the articles establishing three separate branches, to justify 
ordering un-appropriated disbursements.144  
The cases cited to provide support for the order were State ex. rel 
Mattson v. Kiedrowski145 and Clerk of Court’s Compensation for Lyon 
County v. Lyon County Commissioners.146 In the first case, State Treasurer 
Robert Mattson sought a writ of quo warranto directing Finance 
Commissioner Jay Kiedrowski to refrain from executing the State 
Treasurer’s duties as required by a new statute that transferred some of the 
office’s responsibilities and employees to the Finance Department.147 The 
supreme court granted the writ and declared the statute unconstitutional. 
The court reasoned that it had the authority to make the decision, in part, 
because “the Legislature should have known that it could not denude the 
office of its inherent powers and duties even though they had been 
prescribed by statute, and leave the office as an empty shell.”148  
The second case, Lyon County, considered whether the Fifth Judicial 
District could order the Lyon County Board of Commissioners to pay a 
specific salary for the clerk of court.149 The supreme court reversed the 
district court’s order because available legislative-administrative procedures 
had not been exhausted before the order.150 The court also acknowledged 
that the judicial branch has inherent power to keep another branch from 
effectively abolishing a different branch “through [the] exercise of financial 
and regulatory authority.”151 Both Mattson and Lyon County illustrate a 
 
 142. See id. at 16–18. 
 143. See id. 
 144. MINN. CONST. art. I. § 1. 
 145. 391 N.W.2d 777 (Minn. 1986). 
 146. 241 N.W.2d 781 (Minn. 1976). 
 147. State ex. rel. Mattson v. Kiedrowski, 391 N.W. 2d 777, 778 (Minn. 1986). 
 148. Id. at 780–81 (quoting Hudson v. Kelly, 263 P.2d 362, 368 (Ariz. 1953)). 
 149. Clerk of Courts Comp. for Lyon Cty. v. Lyon Cty. Comm’rs, 241 N.W.2d 781, 
782 (Minn. 1976). 
 150. Id. at 787. 
 151. Id. at 784. 
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recognition by the supreme court that if the judicial branch lacked the 
power to stop “unreasonable and intrusive assertions of such authority,” it 
would make “separation of powers . . . a myth.”152  
Ultimately, last minute efforts to avert the 2011 government 
shutdown failed and the order went into effect at midnight on June 30. For 
the next twenty days, millions of dollars were disbursed from the state 
treasury, daily hearings were held before myself and Special Master 
Kathleen Blatz (a former Minnesota Supreme Court Chief Justice and 
former state legislator), approximately 19,000 state employees were laid off 
and began to receive unemployment compensation, state parks and 
highway rest stops were closed, construction projects stopped, and millions 
of citizens were without services they previously received.153 
Given that nearly none of the two-year budget bills had been enacted, 
there would be hundreds of requests from parties wanting to be included 
in the critical core function category. It was impossible to fully anticipate 
the breadth and complexity of the funding process. It soon became 
evident that the judicial branch lacked the “institutional competency” to 
comfortably unravel the different funding mechanisms contained in 
hundreds of funding statutes.154  
Judges are legal generalists. Yet, Special Master Blatz and I had to 
quickly try to make decisions regarding funding provisions, priorities, and 
mechanisms that had taken legislators, commissioners, and experienced 
staff members years to comprehend. This proved to be no easy task. For 
example, some state budget issues involve federal programs, and within 
this category are programs that appear to fall under the Supremacy Clause, 
programs where the state seems to act as a funding conduit, and programs 
that require matching funds from the state. Other programs are funded 
almost exclusively by the state, but with some federal funds. Some are 
federal grants administered by state employees who make the 
disbursement decisions and who also audit and manage the funds. Finally, 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. MINN. MGMT. AND BUDGET, STATE GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWN 2 (2011), 
https://mn.gov/mmb/assets/2011-shutdown-report-October-2011_tcm1059-125041.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GYX2-NW84]. 
 154. Unfortunately, this was not a new problem. Minnesota courts grappled with this 
same challenge of addressing the consequences of a shutdown in prior government 
gridlock cases. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sviggum v. Hanson, 732 N.W.2d 312, 323 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2007) (“Not only is the question nonjusticiable from the courts’ standpoint, but, 
because of the structure and function of legislative power, it is the legislature and not the 
judiciary that has the institutional competency to devise a prospective plan for resolving 
future political impasses.”). 
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some state statutes fund programs continuously and do not require a new 
appropriation in the biennial budget. 
As a result, some early decisions would change as the parties had a 
chance to fully argue the impacts of their requests and educate the court 
about the ways in which their client’s funding was not dependent upon 
biennial appropriations. For example, after a July 1 hearing, the Minnesota 
Zoological Society successfully argued that it operated under a statute that 
established a continuous standing appropriation. Therefore, the 
Minnesota Zoo could reopen.155  
As the budget standoff continued, the funding requests escalated to 
parties that needed state government permits and licenses. For example, 
loggers needed permits to take their harvested wood from the state forests 
to market. The lawyers representing them made it clear that for the people 
in Koochiching County on the Canadian border, the state lumber 
permitting agent’s function was more critical to them than police officers 
or firemen. The black and red flannel-shirted loggers who came to the 
hearing were clearly angry about the financial hardship caused by the 
shutdown and worried about how they would support their families. 
Despite their sincere concerns, the district court ruled that state law did 
not extend far enough for the court to justify granting their request.156  
In a similar instance, liquor retailers needed state permits called 
“buyers cards” in order to buy alcohol from wholesalers. A request to 
order the state to issue those permits also was denied.157 The growing 
threat of Minnesota bars running out of beer during the heat of late-July 
may well have hastened the final resolution of the crisis.158 
Despite the significant constitutional questions raised by the judicially 
ordered disbursements that were made from July 1 until July 21, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court only addressed the 2011 shutdown through 
 
 155. See Minnesota Zoo to Remain Open During State Government Shutdown, ST. 
PAUL PIONEER PRESS (July 1, 2011, 11:01 PM), 
https://www.twincities.com/2011/07/01/minnesota-zoo-to-remain-open-during-state-
government-shutdown/ [https://perma.cc/Y5UK-2YUA]. 
 156. See MINN. FOREST RES. COUNCIL, MINNESOTA FOREST RESOURCES COUNCIL 
2011 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
SUSTAINABLE FOREST RESOURCES ACT 10 (2011), 
https://mn.gov/frc/docs/MFRC_2011_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E26K-KZLJ]. 
 157. See Eric Roper, One by One, Bars Get Tapped Out, STAR TRIB. (July 12, 2011, 
10:58 PM), http://www.startribune.com/one-by-one-bars-get-tapped-out/125459928/ 
[https://perma.cc/TVJ7-2TUG]. 
 158. Id. 
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orders issued in response to two writs of quo warranto.159 Like the 2005 
writs, they were filed by state legislators.160 The first writ was filed on June 
20. It was opposed by the attorney general and the governor. The supreme 
court dismissed this petition without prejudice.161 In its order, the court 
concluded that the petition did not satisfy the established standards for the 
exercise of original jurisdiction for a writ of quo warranto.162 “While this 
court retains its original jurisdiction . . . we today signal our future 
intention to exercise that discretion in only the most exigent of 
circumstances.”163  
The legislators filed a second writ of quo warranto on July 8, 2011.164   
By this time, Minnesota Management and Budget was making 
disbursements pursuant to my original and follow-up orders. The 
petitioners argued that the circumstances were exigent because, in their 
view, the court and special master had “exceeded the jurisdictional 
boundaries of the separation of powers doctrine and have indulged in the 
constitutional powers reserved for the executive and legislative branches of 
government.”165 Heeding the lesson of Swiggum, the petitioners wisely filed 
before the budget issues were resolved and while the court ordered 
disbursements were still being made. 
On July 11, the supreme court agreed to hear the case and arguments 
were scheduled on July 22.166 Escaping review once again, the executive 
and legislative branches finally reached a compromise budget agreement 
the day before the hearing. The supreme court issued its order dismissing 
the second petition on November 30, 2011.167 By then, the governor and 
 
 159. See Order to Dismiss, Limmer v. Swanson (Minn. June 22, 2011) (No. A11-
1107), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2011/other/110561/A11-1107_Order_Dismiss.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BR69-XWJK] [hereinafter “Order to Dismiss”]; Limmer v. Swanson, 
806 N.W.2d 838, 839 (Minn. 2011) (noting that because the constitutional questions had 
become moot by the time of the order, the court may and did decline to address the 
constitutional questions). 
 160. Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, Limmer v. Swanson (Minn. June 20, 2011) 
(No. A11-1107), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2011/other/110561/A11-
1107_Petition_for_Writ_of_Quo_Warrento.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2HV-DZKD]. 
 161. Order to Dismiss, supra note 159, at 2. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, Limmer v. Swanson, 806 N.W.2d 838 
(Minn. July 8, 2011) (No. A11-1222), 
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2011/other/110561/PetitionforWritofQuoWarrantoA111
222RamseyCountyCourt.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9GZ-4XX7]. 
 165. Id. at 3. 
 166. See Limmer v. Swanson, 806 N.W.2d 838, 838–39 (Minn. 2011). 
 167. Id. at 839–40. 
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the legislature had agreed upon the disputed budget bills and enacted 
compromise appropriations laws that were made retroactive to July 1, 
2011. As was done in the aftermath of the 2005 shutdown, the legislation 
expressly “supersede[d] and replace[d] funding authorized by” the Ramsey 
County District Court.168 Again, as in 2005, the court ruled the issues were 
moot because of this language.169  
The court acknowledged that it occasionally decides moot cases that 
were “functionally justiciable” when they involved questions that have 
statewide significance to Minnesotans.170 It also agreed with the petitioners 
that the case was “functionally justiciable.” The majority, nevertheless, 
concluded that they “should not exercise [their] discretion to make an 
exception to the mootness doctrine in this case.”171 In coming to this 
conclusion, the court expressed reluctance to rule on important 
constitutional questions unless it was absolutely necessary.172  
However, like the Sviggum court, the supreme court also urged the 
legislature to act to prevent a future budget crisis.173 Unfortunately, this 
advice, which should be viewed as a respectful way of saying “please stop 
involving the courts in areas that are constitutionally your duty” has proven 
fruitless. Since the 2005 shutdown, there have been multiple legislative 
proposals to enact continuing appropriation mechanisms that would 
basically keep existing funding levels in effect into the next biennium, with 
some specific exceptions, in the event the legislature failed to enact a new 
state budget. Despite the obvious need, none of these bills have been 
successfully enacted into law. 174  
For the third time in a decade, the 2011 dismissal meant Minnesota 
appellate courts had once again failed to address the substantive questions 
underlying these government gridlock cases. The Minnesota Supreme 
Court still has not fully answered whether judicially ordered funding is 
 
 168. Id. at 839. 
 169. Id. at 839–40. 
 170. Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 164, at 34 (quoting State v. 
Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 347–48 (Minn. 2000)). 
 171. Limmer, 806 N.W.2d at 839. 
 172. Id. (citing State v. N. Research Dev. Inst., 294 Minn. 56, 80, 200 N.W.2d 410, 
425 (1972)). 
 173. Id. (explaining that the “legislative and executive branches have the ability to put 
mechanisms in place that would ensure that the district court is not again called upon to 
authorize expenditures by executive branch agencies in the absence of legislative 
appropriations, even if a budget impasse were to occur.”). 
 174. Colbey Sullivan, Automatic Continuing Appropriations and Government 
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permitted by the Minnesota Constitution, whether the failure to fund 
certain governmental functions contravenes the Minnesota Constitution, 
and whether the United States Constitution and federal law authorize state 
treasury expenditures in the absence of a legislative appropriation. The 
court’s approach clearly has prioritized judicial restraint principles and 
respect for the other branches of government in these cases. Though the 
lack of clarity is frustrating, judicial comity is especially important when the 
cases involve separation of powers and other constitutional questions.  
Notwithstanding this prior pattern, the court came much closer to 
clarifying constitutional funding issues in the most recent case of Ninetieth 
Minnesota State Senate v. Dayton.175 Indeed, the court’s ruling in Ninetieth 
Minnesota State Senate should deter future legislatures and governors 
from relying upon the Ramsey County District Court to buffer 
Minnesotans from state budget impasse consequences.  
V. GROWING SKEPTICISM FOR JUDICIALLY-ORDERED FUNDING 
On May 30, 2017, Governor Dayton exercised his line-item veto 
power to excise funding for the legislature from an appropriations bill. In 
making the decision, the governor cited the inclusion of “what he called a 
‘poison pill’ provision to a bill that would have eliminated all Minnesota 
Department of Revenue funding if [a separate tax cut bill was vetoed].”176 
In response, the House of Representatives and State Senate filed a lawsuit 
against the governor.177  
As result, a Ramsey County District Court judge was once again 
presented with a case seeking judicial ordered funding for a governmental 
entity. In this case, Ramsey County Chief Judge John H. Guthmann was 
asked to consider whether article XI, section 1 of the Minnesota 
Constitution prohibits the judiciary from authorizing funding for the 
legislature in the absence of an appropriation. The legislature argued that 
the governor’s line-item veto power could not be used over the 
appropriation without violating the separation-of-powers clause in the 
Minnesota Constitution.178 
Based on the parties’ stipulation, the lower court found that this issue 
was ripe, that the legislature had standing, and that the court could 
 
 175. Ninetieth Minn. State Senate v. Dayton, 903 N.W.2d 609, 612 (Minn. 2017). 
 176. Brian Bakst, Dayton Oks Minn. Agency Spending but Slashes Money to Run 
Legislature, MINN. PUB. RADIO (May 30, 2017), 
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2017/05/30/dayton-ok-complete-minnesota-budget-no-
vetoes [https://perma.cc/DSM7-EQRX]. 
 177. See Ninetieth Minn. State Senate, 903 N.W.2d. at 612. 
 178. Id.; see also MINN. CONST. art. III. 
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authorize temporary funding for both legislative bodies during the 
pendency of the lawsuit.179 In a July 19 order, the district court granted the 
legislature’s request to declare the governor’s line-item vetoes null and 
void because it impermissibly prevented the legislature from exercising its 
constitutional powers and duties.180  
On September 8, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued an order that 
reluctantly allowed the lower court temporary funding stipulation decision 
to remain in effect.181 This order also required the parties to file informal 
memoranda addressing the constitutionality of the judicially ordered 
funding for the legislature, file a joint statement regarding the amount of 
carryover funds available to each legislative body, disclose the date by 
which carryover funds will be exhausted, and address the anticipated 
expenses of the House of Representatives and the State Senate.182  
Moreover, unlike the 2011 trial court decision in In re Temporary 
Funding—where a request to order mediation was refused—the Minnesota 
Supreme Court also ordered the governor and legislature “to participate in 
good-faith efforts to resolve this dispute through mediation.183 The court 
reasoned, “the other Branches should have the opportunity to resolve this 
dispute.184 Notably, Justice Lillehaug—a member of the 2017 Minnesota 
Supreme Court that ordered the mediation—was the attorney who 
represented the governor in his 2011 request for mediation. Ultimately, in 
2017, the mediation was unsuccessful in breaking the stalemate and the 
court had to hear arguments, read briefs, and issue an opinion on the issue 
of whether the governor constitutionally exercised his line-item veto 
authority.  
While the court allowed the temporary court-ordered funding to 
continue, it expressed concern regarding the lower court order. It agreed 
that it is the people of Minnesota whose rights are at stake, but the court 
did “not see in the language of Article XI authority for a judicial funding 
remedy simply because those interests are at risk.”185 The court cautioned 
that “[w]e are unaware of any authority that allows the Judicial Branch to 
authorize spending simply because parties ask a court to do so.”186  
 
 179. Ninetieth Minn. State Senate, 903 N.W.2d. at 615. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Ninetieth Minn. State Senate v. Dayton, 901 N.W.2d 415, 417 (Minn. 2017). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 416. 
 186. Id. 
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On November 16, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued its final 
decision.187 This order concluded that the governor’s exercise of his line-
item veto power in these circumstances did not violate article III of the 
Minnesota Constitution. The ruling overturned the lower court’s 
conclusion that the vetoes “‘effectively abolished’ and ‘nullified’” the 
legislature by depriving it of the funding needed to perform its core 
functions.188 The majority, however, refrained from deciding the issue of 
whether the governor’s exercise of the line-item veto violated article I by 
unconstitutionally coercing the legislature. Its decision was based on 
principles of judicial restraint and respect for the other branches of 
government. The supreme court’s conclusion that the legislature had 
sufficient carry-over funding to continue its usual functions until it 
reconvened in February 2018 was critical to the court’s decision. As a 
result of these carryover funds, the court reasoned, that the veto did not 
have the effect of abolishing the legislature: 
[T]he Legislature has sufficient funding to continue to perform 
its functions independently until it reconvenes. Once it 
reconvenes, the Legislature can pass additional appropriations 
for itself without adhering to the conditions the Governor set in 
his veto message, and the respective powers available to the 
branches under Article IV can be exercised.189 
Despite Ninetieth Minnesota State Senate’s seemingly inconclusive 
outcome, the Supreme Court’s overall opinion suggests that future Ramsey 
County district courts should exercise greater caution before ordering 
treasury disbursements. Part VI discusses this issue in greater detail 
immediately below. 
VI.  ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION  
By virtue of containing the state capitol, district court judges in 
Ramsey County regularly address complex separation of powers cases. 
Both Brayton and In re Temporary Funding were covered extensively in 
the state and national media and resulted in the parties who disagreed with 
the decisions referring to me as an “activist judge.”190 Both cases were filed 
 
 187. Ninetieth Minn. State Senate v. Dayton, 903 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 2017). 
 188. Id. at 619. 
 189. Id. at 624. 
 190. See, e.g., Don Davis, Minnesota Politics: Pawlenty Fights Judicial Legislating, 
GRAND FORKS HERALD (Dec. 31, 2009), https://www.grandforksherald.com/news/governm
ent-and-politics/2116445-minnesota-politics-pawlenty-fights-judicial-legislating 
[https://perma.cc/JUV7-SH9S] (“It is a conservative candidate’s dream: the chance to 
accuse a judge of taking over powers that should be left to legislators and governors. 
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at a time when the executive and legislative branches were controlled by 
opposing parties and involved a failure of those branches to reach a 
compromise that would resolve the remaining appropriation and revenue 
raising issues and enact a balanced budget as required by the state 
constitution.  
In the prior state government shutdown cases handled by Chief Judge 
Lawrence Cohen in 2001, and Chief Judge Gregg Johnson in 2005, and 
myself in 2011, we issued orders providing funding for core state 
government functions. Indeed, these orders were issued despite the clear 
command of the Article III, section 1: 
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct 
departments: legislative, executive and judicial. No person or 
persons belonging to or constituting one of these departments 
shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of 
the others except in the instances expressly provided in this 
constitution.191 
There are no express provisions in the original Minnesota 
Constitution or its amendments that empower the judicial branch to 
authorize funding when the other two departments fail to reach a 
compromise regarding the biennial state budget so that appropriation bills 
passed by the legislature can become law. Additionally, there is no 
constitutional or statutory guidance that addresses how to pay for even the 
most basic government functions during a budget impasse. 
However, even as early as the Sviggum decision, Minnesota courts 
recognized the significant separation of powers issues arising from court-
ordered state treasury disbursements and how they improperly affect 
budget negotiation dynamics.192 While not reaching the merits in that case, 
the court of appeals cautioned, “[i]f the events of 2005 repeat themselves, 
the legislators can raise a timely challenge to seek a judicial remedy for 
their asserted injury.”193  
This sentiment is echoed in the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 2011 
decision. In a footnote, the majority rejected the suggestion in Justice 
Page’s dissent that “by maintaining our traditional institutional reticence on 
issues of constitutional magnitude, particularly those that are moot, we 
either create the perception of or condone violation of constitutional 
 
Minnesota Gov. Tim Pawlenty, a probable 2012 Republican presidential candidate, 
enjoyed that opportunity when Judge Kathleen Gearin ruled that he violated the state 
constitution last summer in making budget cuts.”). 
 191. MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 192. State ex rel. Sviggum v. Hanson, 732 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007). 
 193. Id. at 323. 
30
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 5
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol45/iss2/5
  
532 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:2 
provisions.”194 In his dissent, urging the court to rule on the petition despite 
its mootness, Justice Page noted that “for the third time in a decade it fell 
to a single district court judge in Ramsey County to decide which 
agencies—if any—would continue to operate and, by extension, which 
functions—if any—the state government would continue to perform.”195 
Justice Page suggested that by involving the judicial branch “to decide the 
very issues on which [they] are at an impasse, [they] make the judicial 
branch part of that process. . . . [A]t some level, it seems that each of the 
two political branches, along with their surrogates, [are] using the judicial 
branch as a tool to reach their respective political ends.”196 
In 2017, the Minnesota Supreme Court likewise never reached the 
ultimate question of whether the judicial branch can order disbursements 
from the state treasury without an appropriation under any circumstances. 
However, the court included language that should cause district court 
judges to hesitate when asked to order temporary funding:  
The only conclusion we can draw from the plain language of the 
constitution and these decisions is that Article XI, Section 1 of 
the Minnesota Constitution does not permit judicially ordered 
funding for the Legislative Branch in the absence of an 
appropriation.197  
In drawing this conclusion, the supreme court relied on its decision in 
State v. Dahlgren.198 In that case, the court refused to order funding to pay 
for counsel for indigent criminal defendants even though it agreed that the 
defendants have a constitutional right to counsel.199  
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s strong unambiguous language in 
Ninetieth Minn. State Senate hopefully will cause both the executive and 
legislative branches of government to avoid the heated conflicts that have 
twice pushed them over the shutdown cliff. If they do not, they risk the 
possibility that future Ramsey County District Court judges will refuse to 
bail them out from their failure to reach some type of budget compromise.  
There are other remedies that should be explored by both the 
legislative and executive branches. As the Sviggum court explained, “[t]he 
legislature could prevent another judicially-mandated disbursement of 
public funds without an authorized appropriation by, for example, creating 
an emergency fund to keep the government functioning during a 
 
 194. Limmer v. Swanson, 806 N.W.2d 838, 839–40 n.1 (Minn. 2011). 
 195. Id. at 841. 
 196. Id. at 843. 
 197. Ninetieth Minn. State Senate v. Dayton, 903 N.W.2d at 620. 
 198. 107 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1961). 
 199. Id. 
31
Gearin: The “Law of Ramsey County” – Reflections of a Trial Judge on Stat
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
  
2019] THE “LAW OF RAMSEY COUNTY” 533 
budgetary impasse or enacting a statute setting forth the procedures to be 
followed during a budgetary impasse.”200  
Some states, chief among them Wisconsin and Rhode Island, have 
enacted default budget statutes.201 These statutes have not significantly 
hindered the enactment of timely budgets in these states. In a 2015 law 
review article analyzing the long-term effects of government shutdowns on 
public trust, David Louk and David Gamage suggest that urging legislators 
to rely on their better angels is unlikely to be successful.202 “Rather than 
attempting the Sisyphean task of exhorting Democrats and Republicans to 
work together on bipartisan budget compromises, we advocate for 
implementation of default budget policies that would automatically trigger 
when negotiation failure occurs.”203 In their view, which Minnesota’s 
repeated shutdown experience bears out, “[i]f we are correct in predicting 
that the risk of negotiation failure is here to stay, then reforms should aim 
at reducing the harmful consequences of such failure.”204 
The supreme court’s decision in Ninetieth Minnesota State Senate 
suggests that the Minnesota Legislature would be well-served by adopting 
the types of mechanisms discussed by Louk and Gamage.205 Moreover, the 
court’s decision to expressly preserve the possibility of judicially ordered 
funding as part of its opinion nonetheless indicates that the overall effect of 
Ninetieth Minnesota State Senate is to constrain the expansive funding 
orders previously authorized by Ramsey County District Courts: 
Our decision today should not be read to foreclose the 
possibility of a judicial remedy in a different situation. . . . 
Minnesotans have a constitutional right to three independent 
branches of government, each functioning at a level sufficient to 
allow the exercise of the constitutional powers committed to 
each branch for the “security, benefit, and protection of the 
people, in whom all political power is inherent.”206 
This passage suggests that the courts may have a funding role if the 
legislature does not have reserve funds or newly appropriated money to 
 
 200. State ex rel. Sviggum v. Hanson, 732 N.W.2d 312, 323 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007). 
 201. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 20.002(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 5); 35 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. § 35-3-19 (West 2019, Westlaw through Ch. 20 of the 2019 Reg. Sess.). These 
statutes are discussed in Sullivan, supra note 174.  
 202. David Scott Louk & David Gamage, Preventing Government Shutdowns; 
Designing Default Rules for Budgets, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 181, 236–37 (2015). 
 203. Id. at 237.  
 204. Id. 
 205. See Ninetieth Minn. State Senate v. Dayton, 903 N.W.2d 609, 625 (Minn. 2017). 
 206. Id. (quoting MINN. CONST. art. I, § 1). 
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legislatively function. It also is a reminder that all three co-equal branches 
must have funding to exercise their constitutional powers. 
At a minimum, given Ninetieth Minnesota State Senate’s totality, 
future Ramsey County District Court judges will be more hesitant to order 
Minnesota Management and Budget to disburse public funds without 
appropriations and more likely to limit any expenditures that are ordered. 
The consequences of this shift would be widespread for Minnesotans. 
More facilities would be closed, more state employees would be laid off, 
more agencies would cease operations, more private businesses would 
suffer, and the people of Minnesota would be more adversely impacted. 
Even before Ninetieth Minnesota State Senate, I questioned whether 
I had ordered expenditures for too many government functions 
considering the constitutional issues raised in the quo warranto petitions. I 
wondered what I would do if a balanced budget was not enacted before 
my order expired on July 31, 2011. I became increasingly concerned that 
my order was too broad. In an interview given two days after the shutdown 
ended, I explained that I thought judicial involvement in budgeting was a 
negative consequence of our political system becoming more divisive. As a 
result, some elected officials have lost sight of the effect that zero-sum 
politicking has on citizens who may not pay significant attention to 
government.207 
Ninetieth Minnesota State Senate should serve as a valuable guide for 
future district court judges put in the difficult position of sorting out 
government gridlock. For legislators and governors, it should serve as a 
warning that the consequences of future impasses, in the absence of a 
default budgeting law, will be more pronounced, create greater hardship 
for Minnesotans, and increase the public’s frustration with government 
institutions. It should inspire serious research, thoughtful debate, and the 
careful enactment of laws that prevent judicially ordered funding divorced 
from the legislature’s public policy setting prerogative. Ultimately, our 
system of elected government demands that the selection of policies and 
balancing of stakeholder interests belong with those who write the laws, 
rather than those who apply it. 
 
 
 207. See Grovum, supra note 127 (“It’s easy to say people are becoming less willing to 
compromise. Compromise doesn’t mean you give up your principles. Compromise to me 
means you realistically look at your position, one, see how realistic it is that it can succeed 
at this time. You don’t give up your position. And then you look at, all right . . . how much 
is it going to hurt the state if I just stick with my position? How much should I basically 
reach some common agreement that isn’t exactly what I wanted, what either side 
wanted?”).  
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